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Fundamental Rights on the Infobahn:
Regulating the Delivery of Internet
Related Services Within the European
Union
By PATRICK G. CRAGO":
I. Introduction
The European Union (EU) t and the Internet' share similar goals:
to transcend traditional political, geographical, and cultural barriers in
order to promote greater regional and transnational cooperation.
3
* Member of the Class of 1997. B.A. Stanford University, 1994. The author would
like to thank Dr. Bernd Langeheine for his thoughtful commentary. Any errors or omis-
sions are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. The European Union (EU) is the current name given to an evolving political and
economic institutional framework for uniting European countries organized under the Eu-
ropean Coal & Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom), and the European Economic Community (EEC) (the name of the EEC was
changed by Article G of the Treaty On European Union to the European Community
(EC)). See JosEPHINE SHAw, EUROPEAN Co~u.=NrrY LAW 4-5 (1993); European Commis-
sion, Chronology of the Union (visited Nov. 3, 1996) <http'J/europa.eu.inttenTreuhist!
euchron.html>. The EU is currently composed of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal,
Austria, Finland, and Sweden. European Commission, EU In Brief (visited Nov. 3, 1996)
<http:/wwv.eurunion.org/profilefmembars.htm>. See discussion infra Part II for a history
of the European Union. In order to avoid confusion, references to the EU will represent a
reference to all the Communities and their unified institutions. The EU is not a legal
personality, so where possible, references to the EU in this Note that would require a legal
personality should be understood to be references to the European Community. Finally,
for the purposes of this Note, references to EC Treaty will represent a reference to the
Treaties of Rome and the Single European Act, as amended by the TEU.
2. The Internet is popularly referred to in the United States as the "Information Su-
perhighway" and in Europe as the "Infobahn." See discussion infra Part III for an exami-
nation and explanation of the Internet.
3. Knit Your Own Superhighway, ECONo, sT, Oct. 16, 1993, at 101 (explaining Presi-
dent of the European Commission Jacque Delors' hope that European countries could be
bound by networks to bring "Europeans closer together and mak[e] them richer.") Id.;
Green Paper. European Update: Telecommunications, § 1.1 (last update Oct. 1995), avad.
able in WESTLAW, Eurupdate Database. A Green Paper is a report produced by the
European Commission for public discussion and debate. After analyzing a specific prob-
lem and offering a solution, the Commission then distributes the report to EU Member
States and relevant organizations to foster a dialogue on the subject. The Member States
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With this dual onslaught of technology and regional integration ef-
forts, these goals appear to be transforming themselves into realities.
4
However, what should be a time for celebration, with 1997 signifying
the fifty-first anniversary of the computer information age- and the
fifth year of the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),6 has
instead witnessed the growth of a divisive conflict, as governments
around the world debate the degree to which they will regulate the
delivery of services and content on the Internet.7 Although the In-
ternet, as a medium of communication, should be helping the EU inte-
grate and promote its economic power and cultural diversity, it has
instead generated fragmented, individualized efforts from many of the
EU Member States ("Member States"), as each Member State strug-
gles to develop a coherent national response to the effect of the In-
ternet on national laws and social values, such as: obscenity;8
pornography;9 politically sensitive material;10 material with national
security implications;" racially/culturally sensitive material;12 techno-
logical standards for the delivery of Internet access and related serv-
ices;' 3 and the future individuality of the Member State (culturally and
and the organizations then offer comments on the Green Paper. See Arthur Fakes, The
EEC's Directive on Software Protection and its Moral Rights Loophole, 5 SOFTWARE L.J.
531, 533 (1992).
4. Strains on the Global Village, FIN. TiNrs, Feb. 16, 1996, at 21.
5. Randall Mikkelsen, Governments Wary of Internet Content, DEs MOINES REO.,
Feb. 20, 1996, at 6.
6. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. D 1992 OJ. (C 191) 1 [hereinaf-
ter TEU].
7. Jonathan Green-Armytage, Governments Tighten the Net, COMP TER WVLY., Feb.
8,1996, at 16; Wayne Arnold, Hong Kong Won't Regulate Cyberspace, AsIAN WALL, ST. J.,
Jan. 23, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL-WSJA 3795483.
8. Bonn Approves Internet Law Barring Pornography, Neo-Nazis, Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, Dec. 11, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database [hereinafter Bonn
Approves Internet Law]; Mikkelsen, supra note 5, at 6.
9. Isabelle Parenthoen, Internet Grapples with Laws from Pornography to Property
Rights, Agence France-Presse, Dec. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12200600; Mikkelsen,
supra note 5, at 6.
10. Id.
11. Graeme Browning, Another Federal Code to Crack, NAT. LAW J., Jan. 11, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7227983; No Secrets on the Web, USA TODAY, Jan. 29, 1996, at 16A
(discussing the French government's banning of a book on the life of Mitterand and the
government pursuit of this ban on the Internet based on purported national security
concerns).
12. French Court to Test Limits of Laws in Cyberspace, Ci. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1997, at 6;
Amy Harmon, Why the French Hate the Internet, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1997, at Al; Id Nous
Parlons Francais, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 20, 1997, at A8; Bonn Approves Internet Law, supra note
8; Mikkelsen, supra note 5, at 6.
13. EU Probes BT, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, Belgacom's lnternet Activities,
AFX News, Jan. 30, 1997, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database [hereinafter EU
[Vol. 20:467
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politically) as the "onrush of globalisation calls into question the fu-
ture of the nation state as a meaningful political... unit.114 As an
organization, the EU is uniquely poised, with the political and legal
competencies granted to it under the EC Treaty, to provide a cohesive
framework to guide its Member States through an Internet standards
harmonization process. In developing a cohesive baseline from which
to regulate the delivery of Internet related services among the Mem-
ber States, the EU can ensure that the social and cultural identity of
its Member States are protected.
The explosive growth of the Internet is rapidly creating the need
for unified political and legal responses to sustain the availability of
Internet services.'- Without a guiding unified legal mechanism or
political imperative for a harmonized effort, nations have reacted uni-
laterally to this phenomenon in order to protect their interests.
16
Many countries are struggling to balance their tripartite interests in:
maintaining their cultural identity; 17 ensuring that the regulations do
Probes BT]; James Freeman, The Intemet" Fun While it Lasted, Jan. 23, 1997. WALL ST. J.
EuR., Jan. 22, 1997, at A14, available in 1997 WL-WSJE 3S0516S; Europe: Net Asset -
Internet Addresses, Reuter Textline Media and Marketing Europe, Dec. 22, 1995. available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ecnews File.
14. Anne Swardson, French Groups Sue to Bar English.Only Internet Sites; Georgia
Tech's Web Page in Lorraine at Issue, WASH. PosT, Dec. 24, 1996, at Al. While opaning a
conference on new technologies, French President Jacques Chirac distilled the issue by
stating:
The stakes are clear. If, in the new media [referring to the Internet], our lan-
guage, our programs, our creations are not strongly present, the young generation
of our country will be economically and culturally marginalized.
Id. (emphasis added); Strains on the Global Village, supra note 4, at 21.
15. The number of hosts connected to the Internet has nearly tripled in the period
from January 1995 to July 1996, from 4,853,000 to 12,831,000. Network Wizards, Host
Count History (visited Nov. 3, 1996) <http/ww.nw.comfzonefhost-count-histor >. From
August 1981 to July 1991, the number of hosts on the Internet grew from 213 to 535,M0.
Id. While the percentage rate of growth during the 19S0's was, on average, greater than in
the early 1990s, it is the increasing availability of access to the Internet that has many
nations concerned. A "host" is a domain name with a corresponding address. Network
Wizards, Domain Survey Definitions (visited Nov. 3, 1996) <http:jlwvw.nv.con.tzone)
WWW/defs.html> [hereinafter Network ,,izards. Domain Survey Definitions]. Any com-
puter system connected to the Internet whether full time, part time, direct, or dialup would
be a host. Id. See discussion infra Part H.A.
16. See Singapore Curbs Internet Freedom, NEW MEDA AGE, July 6, 1995, at 2, avad-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File; Green-Armytage, supra note 7, at 16; Mikkels2n,
supra note 5, at 6; Bonn Approves Internet Law, supra note 8; French Court to Test Limits
of Cyberspace, supra note 12, at 6.
17. Luciana CasteUina, Chair of the European Parliament's Culture Committee, stated
"[w]hat is at stake is the survival of the cultural identity of Europe." Strains on te Global
Village, supra note 4, at 21. Even where a government attempts to completely ban a partic-
ular type of service, it will not necessarily follow that the national culture or the quality of
1997]
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not hinder the competitiveness of national information industries;18
and upholding public morals through legislation. 19 To balance these
three competing interests, nations have responded by promoting pri-
vate Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to unilaterally censor the infor-
mation available from their portion of the network; 20 passing laws or
threatening lawsuits to censor the information received by or originat-
ing in the regulating nation;2' or using a combination of government
and private censorship over what can be transmitted or received
within a nation.2
As the preceding indicates, Member States have been responding
in a reactionary and fractional manner.23 The increasing fractionaliza-
tion of an EU-wide legal standard addressing Internet related serv-
ices, as Member States proceed with their individual regulations, runs
counter to the basic purposes of the Internet and the EU. Instead of
allowing this type of Member State response to continue, the Euro-
pean Union should take the lead, through legislative and/or judicial
measures, to rule on the propriety of Member State regulation of the
the programming will be enhanced. The proliferation of lookalike Hollywood game shows
and soap operas after a ban in France exemplifies this theory. Id.
18. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.1 "Advanced telecommunications are thus recog-
nized as an essential basis for the development of knowledge and information based indus-
tries and societies." ld.
19. See generally Strains on the Global Village, supra note 4, at 21; Mikkelsen, supra
note 5, at 6; Bonn Approves Internet Law, supra note 8; French Court to Test Limits of
Laws in Cyberspace, supra note 12, at 6.
20. Kimberly Strassel, Watch Group in U.K. Hails Internet Self-Regulation, WALL ST.
J. EUR., Jan. 9, 1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL-WSJE 3804393; Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: Illegal & Harmful Content on the Internet,
COM(96)487 final [hereinafter Illegal and Harmful Content on the Irternet] (discussing
the efforts of Internet Service Provider Associations (ISPAs) in the U.K., the Netherlands,
France, and Germany). For an example of a well-received private code of practice see
Internet Service Provider Association (ISPA-uk) Ltd., Internet Service Provider Associa-
tion - Statement of Policy: ISPA Code of Practice (visited Jan. 31, 1997) <httpJ/
www.ispa.org.uk/policy.html>.
21. Strains on the Global Village, supra note 4, at 21; Mikkelsen, Yupra note 5, at 6;
Bonn Approves Internet Law, supra note 8; French Court to Test Limits of Laws in Cyber.
space, supra note 12, at 6; EU Probes BT, supra note 13.
22. James Pressley & Martin du Bois, EU Commission May Let Cable Firms Run
Telecoms, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 10, 1995, at 4 (discussing how service providers on the
French Minitel system have agreed to exert some degree of censorship over the content of
their transmissions); French Court to Test Limits of Law in Cyberspace, supra note 12, at 6;
EU Probes BT, supra note 13; Strassel, supra note 20; European Commission, supra note
20.
23. See generally Ian Griffiths, We Need a Devil of a Debate on Superhighway, Evening
Standard, Aug. 9, 1995, at 32. See also Louise Kehoe, Media Futures: Porn on the Net, FIN.
TiMNis, Jan. 22, 1996, at 11.
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delivery of Internet related services. The EU should further consider
the extent to which it should, consistent with the EC Treaty, allow
Member State regulation of the Internet and ISPs. The EU has the
legal mechanisms in place to promulgate a unified legal and political
solution to this crisis. This effort could serve as an international
model for the development of regional Community standards for reg-
ulating the delivery of Internet related services.
Consistent with the philosophies of the Internet and regional or-
ganizations like the EU, this Note proposes that supranational solu-
tions are the most appropriate responses to the problems surrounding
regulation of the Internet. Looking to the EU and its institutions as a
model, this Note will first explore the ease and immediacy with which
Member States are taking jurisdiction over Internet related claims, fo-
cusing on the jurisdictional principles of customary public interna-
tional law and European Community law ("EC law"). The Note will
explore the implication of these jurisdictional issues, focusing on the
fractionalization of legal and business standards that have occurred,
and will continue to occur, when each Member State rules on its indi-
vidual ability to regulate the delivery of Internet related services and
the potential for the attachment of liability. The Note will then con-
centrate on how the EU can, under principles of Community law, pro-
vide a cohesive framework within which to generate Community-wide
standards for Internet related claims. It will then briefly contrast the
proposed Community solution with those employed by other nations.
Finally, it will explore how a Community solution based in large por-
tion on a set of fundamental rights with respect to the delivery of In-
ternet related services promulgated at the Community level which can
serve as a model for other countries and regional economic integra-
tion organizations.
H. The European Union
A. Overview
The EU is an evolving political and economic transnational or-
ganization of European countries.24 The process and nomenclature
began in 1951 with the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC), comprised of France, Germany, Italy,
and the BENELUX (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) coun-
24. Prmup RAwoPTH, THE LEGISLATIrE PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN CO:.muNqrY 1-3
(1993).
1997]
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tries.s In 1957 the Treaties of Rome established the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic
Community (EEC), both signified deeper integration among Member
States.26 The Single European Act (SEA) went into effect in 1987,
further tightening the scope and pace of the integration efforts as,
among other things, it introduced majority voting for all areas directly
related to the Single Market.27 Finally, in 1992, the TEU, also known
as the Maastricht Treaty, amended the Treaties of Rome and the SEA
to integrate the existing Communities more tightly together under the
common framework of the EU.28 By 1996, the number of Member
States had increased to fifteen.
B. Institutions and Procedures
The EU's legislative branch is comprised of the European Com-
mission ("Commission"), the European Council of Ministers ("Coun-
cil"), and the European Parliament ("Parliament").29  The
Commission proposes Community policy and legislation 3) to be re-
viewed and approved by the Council3' and, in some cases, by Parlia-
ment.32 The Commission is responsible for policing Member State
compliance with all EC law.33
The EU has four main legislative tools to establi-sh Community
law: a Directive; a Regulation; a Decision; and Recommendations and
Opinions.34 A Regulation is generally applicable and has direct effect
in all Member States.3s A Directive is binding in the result to be
achieved, but it allows each Member State to choose 'the method by
which the result is nationally realized. 36 A Decision is binding upon
25. Id. at 1.
26. lit
27. SINGLE EUROPEAN Acr, June 29, 1987, O.J. (L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
28. RAWORTH, supra note 24, at 2.
29. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 137-63
1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
30. Id. arts. 155-63.
31. Id. arts. 145-54. The Council of Ministers should not be confused with the Euro-
pean Council. The responsibilities of the European Council include setting priorities for
the EU that provide the impetus for political developments and establishment of guide-
lines for institutions such as required by the Economic and Monetary Union. TEU art. D.
32. EC TREATY art. 155; see generally id. arts. 189b, 189c.
33. Id. art. 192.
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any Member States, individuals, and/or undertakings it addresses.3 7
Recommendations and Decisions do not carry any binding force.33
The Council is the body primarily responsible for enacting bind-
ing legislation throughout the EU, setting political objectives, and
resolving Member State differences.3 9 Depending upon the nature of
the legislation, the Council may have to obtain the consent of the
Parliament.40
The Parliament has three fundamental powers: the power to leg-
islate, the power of the purse,4 1 and a limited power to investigate and
issue a report on executive decisions.42 The TEU reestablishes that
the legislative role of the Parliament is four-fold, depending upon the
nature of the legislation being reviewed.43 First, in circumstances such
as agricultural price reviews, under the Consultation Procedure, Par-
liament must be consulted and must issue an opinion before the Coun-
cil can adopt a legislative proposal from the European Commission.4
Second, Parliament may utilize the Cooperation Procedure.45 Under
this procedure, Parliament has two opportunities to amend and com-
ment on legislative proposals issued by the Commission, but the
Council has the power to overrule the amendment.4b The Council is
then obliged to seek conciliation wvith Parliament.47 Third, under the
Co-Decision procedure provided for in Article 189b, Parliament
shares decision-making power with the Council equally through a
Conciliation Committee composed equally of members of the Parlia-
ment and the Council.4s This procedural power is limited to issues
involving the free movement of services, goods, and people, the estab-
lishment of an internal market, environmental issues, and consumer
protection legislation.49 This power means that Parliament can veto a
legislative proposal adopted by the Council if members feel that the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. arts. 145-54.
40. See id. arts. 1S9b, 1M9e.
41. European Commission, Powers and Responsibilities of the European Parliament
(visited Mar. 6, 1997) <http'/europa.eu.int/enfcommopoceJbrocintfgbfdefault.html> [here-
inafter Powers and Responsibilities].
42. EC TREATY art. 138c.
43. Id. arts. 189-92.
44. Powers and Responsibilities, supra note 41.
45. EC TREATY art. 1S9c.
46. Id.
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Council has not taken Parliament's opinion into account or no deci-
sion can be reached.5 0 Finally, the Assent Procedure provides that
Parliament's approval is required for aH new members, international
agreements, or associations with third parties.:
Although all Member State courts are responsible for apply EC
law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is responsible for interpret-
ing EC law and is the final arbiter of all disputes concerning the inter-
pretation of Community treaties. 2 In fact, the ECJ alone can decide
on the validity of Community law.53 Under Article 177 of the EC
Treaty, the ECJ has the power to deliver preliminary rulings concern-
ing the interpretation of Community treaties even where the question
is raised before the courts of a Member State. 4
Il. The Internet Defined
A. Network of Networks
The Internet is a global amalgamation of computer networks
55
connected by a common communications protocol, Transmission Con-
trol Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).56 The Internet originated in
1969 as a project sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense called
ARPANET.57 ARPANET was designed to connect Department of
Defense computers with other communication systems across a na-
50. Id.
51. lIL
52. EC TREATY arts. 164-88. For a thorough examination of the European Court of
Justice see generally L. NEvrLLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTIcE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrms (4th ed. 1994).
53. EC TREATY arts. 164-88.
54. Article 177 of the EC TREATY states in relevant part:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty... Where such a question is raised before any
court or tribunal of a member State, that court or tribunal may ... request the
Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Id. art. 177. As there appears to be a judicial remedy under national law in most countries,
the final paragraph of Article 177, requiring a mandatory appeal to the ECJ, would most
likely not apply.
55. Ed Krol & E. Hoffman, FYI on "What is the Internet" (visited Nov. 3, 1996) <http:/
/www.intemic.netlrfclrfcl462.txt>.
56. Id. See also Information Sciences Institute, Internet Protocol (visited Nov. 3, 1996)
<http.//www.intemic.net/rfcdrfc791.txt>. All the different networks are able to communi-
cate with each other employing TCP/IP as a standard suite of network communication and
addressing protocols, although many of the networks may employ other communications
protocols as well. J. Postel, Internet Control Message Protocol (visited Nov. 3, 1996) <http:
//www.internic.net/rfcrfc777.txt>; J. Postel, Internet Protocol (visited Nov. 3, 1996) <http:
/Iwww.internic.net/rfc/rfc791.txt>.
57. ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET USER'S GUIDE AND CATALOG 11-12 (1995).
[Vol. 20:467
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tional network, such as radio and satellite, to ensure the continual
availability of information,58 and more specifically, that the military
and government retained their ability to communicate in the event of
a national catastrophe, such as a nuclear war.5 9 Once the technology
proved successful, more and more networks were connected to the
expanding ARPANET.60 Universities, the National Science Founda-
tion, and other research centers around the world wanted to share
resources and also benefit from the opportunity to communicate with
their international peers.6' This pattern of expansion, whereby indi-
vidual national networks connect themselves to a national "back-
bone" network to access and expand the Internet, describes the man-
ner of growth for the Internet.62
Because new networks are connected daily, Internet usage statis-
tics are imprecise; however in 1996 it was estimated that approxi-
mately thirteen million60 host computer systems" extending to more
than a hundred countries comprised the Internet.65 Between 1993 and
1995, Europe alone averaged a 74.6% annual growth rate, with over
three million host computers systems currently connected to the
Internet.6
6
Business executives67 and governments recognize the imperative
of timely information to maintain a competitive advantage., More-
over, information experts recognize that the information providing the
largest edge is not generated internally, but comes from the "outside
world. ' 69 The Internet offers this type of access to information, serv-
ices, and individuals. In spite of a lingering concern about the security
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id.
60. Krol & Hoffman, supra note 55.
61. 1&
62. KRoL, supra note 57, at 12-13.
63. Network Wizards, Host Distribution by Top-Level Domain Name (visited Nov. 3,
1996) <http'/wvww.nw.comlzoneWWWldist.bynum.html> [hereinafter Network wizards,
Host Distribution].
64. Network Wizards, Domain Survey Definitions, supra note 15.
65. Network Wizards, Host Distribution, supra note 63.
66. Network Coordination Centre, European Hostcount (visited Nov. 3, 1996) <http:II
www.ripe.netlhtmllframesfhostcount.html>. The last hostcount query in September 1996
found 3,290,100 hosts. Id.
67. MARY J. CRONIN, DOING MoRE BusN -ss ON ThE INrERNEr. How THE EtEc.
TRONIC HIGHWAY is TANsFoPniNG AmEmRICAN Co.mIPANIEs 12 (1995).
68. Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.1.
69. CRONIN, supra note 67, at 13.
1997]
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of the Internet7 ° and Internet commerce,7' the Internet has become
the communications medium of choice.72
B. Examples of Internet Political Utility
The utility of the Internet is exemplified by the timely availability
of political correspondence and news from distant and generally iso-
lated nations. For example, during the attempted coup that ushered in
the demise of the Soviet Union in August 1991, RELiable COMmuni-
cations (RELCOM), a small e-mail company with an Internet connec-
tion, was the only available conduit for information from within the
former Soviet Union.73 Western media was cut off. 4 The major
Western news sources, such as the Associated Press (Pi?) and Cable
News Network (CNN), used RELCOM as their primary source of in-
formation and also as a channel to disseminate outside information.7"
In addition, Tiananmen Square, the the Yugoslavian civil war, the fall
of communism, and and the Los Angeles riots were all described by
people who witnessed these events and transmitted 1imely reports
across the Internet.76 More recently, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (the Marxist guerrillas in Peru who stormed the Japanese
embassy there and took hostages) had supporters posting updates,
communiqu6s from inside the embassy, and photographs on the
Internet.77
C. Trans-European Network
As a transnational telecommunication segment on the Internet,
the pan-European telecommunications technical "infrastructure" out-
lined in the TEU78 is still in its nascency when compared to the infor-
70. Bob Violino, Your Worst Nightmare, Internet Insecurity, INFO. WEEK, Feb. 19,
1996, at 34-36.
71. Bob Violino, Netscape Pushes Internet Security, INFO. WEEK, Fb. 19, 1996, at 30.
72. See Mikkelsen, supra note 5, at 6.
73. TRAcy LAQuEY, with JEANNE C. RYER, THE INTERNET COMPANION: A BEGIN-
NER'S GUIDE TO GLOBAL NETWORKING 4 (1993) (citation omitted).
74. ld. at 4-6.
75. Id.
76. Id at 6.
77. Tupac Amaru Wages Web Propaganda War, Reuters, ORANOE CouNTY REO., Jan.
5, 1997, at A08.
78. EC TREATY arts. 129b, 129c, 129d. Articles 129b and 129c do not provide a legal
basis by which the EU may regulate the delivery of Internet related services as they are
more concerned with governing the Community contributions to a trans-European net-
work that is technical inter-operable. Id. at 129b(1), (2); 129c(1). See also Green Paper,
supra note 3, §§ 1.1, 1.3.3, 4.2.2.4, 4.2.2.5.
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mation infrastructure of the United States.7 9 The capacity and
capabilities of the most advanced Member State networks still lags
significantly behind the United States. 0 Additionally, even among
Member States, there are huge disparities in regional access to tele-
communications technology and services.3 1 Although Member States
must overcome significant hurdles to harmonize their telecommunica-
tion infrastructures, such as developing "broadband" (high capacity)
networks s2 this type of development would greatly benefit from a sin-
gle European Community standard addressing how the delivery of in-
formation and services over the Internet will be regulated.
What the European networks lack in current technology and ca-
pabilities may be offset by an enthusiasm to harness the commercial
potential of the Internet.as Experts estimate that European on-line
services will grow by three billion dollars in the next five years.8s
Much like the harmonization of protocols governing the networks
weaving Member State economies together, the EU requires the har-
monization of legal and business standards for Internet commerce and
other related services.' In short, without a definitive set of Commu-
nity standards governing the delivery of Internet related services, the
development of a trans-European network and the concomitant ser-
vice industries will be retarded by the fractured law governing the de-
livery of Internet related services already developing in Member
States."6 One need only look to the benefits and reasons surrounding
79. Knit Your Own Superhighway, supra note 3, at 102; see also Jack Powers, What's
the World Coming To?, LAN MAGAZwE, May 1993, at 38.
80. Powers, supra note 79, at 38.
81. Id. (discussing the proliferation of computers but distinct lack of network connec-
tion between regions); Knit Your Own Superhighway, supra note 3, at 102.
82. Knit Your Own Superhighway, supra note 3, at 102. The discussion of a unified
methodology to achieve the technological harmonization required by future networks is
beyond the scope of this Note, but see generally Green Paper, supra note 3.
83. See Felix Salmon & Rosamund Jones, U.K. Megabucks and Megabytes. Reuter
Textline Euromoney, Nov. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ecnews File.
84. Id.
85. Communication from the European Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee on the Regions on
'Europe at the Forefront of the Global Information Society: Rolling Action Plan,
COM(96)607 final (discussing the EU's recognition that to improve the business environ-
ment, the EU must promote "internal market principles (Le., the free circulation of goods,
the free provision of services ... in the information society context.... [To einsure that the
necessary conditions are met for the introduction of electronic commerce ... is also a
major priority.").
86. See generally Silvia Ascarelli, Two On-Line Services Firms Probed in Racial Hatred
Case, Dow Jones News Service-Wall Street Journal Stories, Jan. 26, 1996, available in
WESTLAW, EuroNews Database; Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net; Cyberspace:
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the harmonization of tariffs within the EU and to the G AfTT to realize
an impetus for action and to avoid post hoc responses to regulate the
delivery of Internet related services.
IV. Member State Jurisdictional Bases to Regulate the
Delivery of Internet Related Services
Public international law generally recognizes three different cate-
gories of jurisdiction that form a nation's right to subject foreign activ-
ities to national laws:87 jurisdiction to prescribe,88 jurisdiction to
adjudicate,8 9 and jurisdiction to enforce. 90 While the issues surround-
ing the jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce Internet related claims are
significant, the primary hurdle to overcome, and the focus of analysis
in this section, is the jurisdiction to prescribe. If a Member State,
under principles of public international law consistent with EC law,
exercises jurisdiction to prescribe these Internet related claims, then a
chilling effect on the delivery of Internet related services has been
achieved.91 The mere specter of legal liability has already lead many
Critics Accuse Germany's Deutsche Telekom of Overreacting, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1996, at
D2 [hereinafter Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net] (discussing German responses to
the regulation of the Internet); Bonn Approves Internet Law, supra note 8; French Court to
Test Limits of Law in Cyberspace, supra note 12, at 6; EU Probes BT, suora note 13; Stras-
sel, supra note 20, at 4.
87. Although there is no single source to provide the exact contou ,s of International
Law and its principles, the American Law Institute's efforts in the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States represents a thoughtful and Ihorough compila-
tion of generally accepted and practiced customary public international law.
88. RESTATEMENT (THImD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIM: UNITED STATES
§§ 401-04 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement specifically provides that the ju-
risdiction to prescribe is defined as the ability to make national law "applicable to the
activities, relations, or status of person, or the interests of person in things, whether by
legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determina-
tion of a court." Id. at § 401(a). A general survey of the application of these jurisdictional
bases for Member States to regulate, wholesale, the delivery of Internet related services is
beyond the scope of this Note.
89. Id. § 401(b). The Restatement states that the jurisdiction to adjudicate is the right
of a nation "to subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribu-
nals, whether in civil or in criminal proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the
proceedings." Id.
90. Id. § 401(c). Jurisdiction to enforce is described by the Restatement as the right
"to induce or compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations,
whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudi-
cial action." Id.
91. See AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet; Computers: Company
Says it May Face Charges There, Along with CompuServe, Another Firm. L.A. TIMES, Feb.
3, 1996, at D2 [hereinafter AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet]; Provider
Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note 86, at D2; Ascarelli, supra rote 86.
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multinational corporations to suspend their delivery of some Internet
related services. 2 The following section will focus on general public
international law principles that would provide a Member State with a
legitimate claim to prescribe jurisdiction over the delivery of Internet
related services.1
3
A. General Public Mandate to Regulate the Delivery of Services
over the Internet
Although the current hysteria concerning pornography on the In-
ternet (also known as "Cybersmut") has been the impetus for many
Member State actions,94 the technological implications of attempting
to screen off certain portions of the Internet from national access
mean that many other uncontroversial services will be blocked off as
well.95 Although the current focus is on child pornography and neo-
Nazi propaganda,96 there is a legitimate concern that one or more
Member States may outlaw "indecent" material.97 Such a loose and
undefined standard provides too much opportunity for the imple-
menting Member State to apply its own particular values to generate a
myriad of conflicting standards for regulating Internet content and
services (similar to the standard the United States adopted in its re-
cent Telecommunications Bill)."
92. See id.
93. See discussion infra Parts IV B & C for an exploration of the competency of Mem-
ber States to exert jurisdiction over the movement of transnational services or goods under
the EC Treaty.
94. See Kehoe, supra note 23, at 11; Cyberporn, FIN. TMES, Jan. 9, 1996, at 15; Green-
Armytage, supra note 7, at 16.
95. Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note 79, at D2 (explaining the im-
perfection of blocking information on the Internet, whereby only specifically identified
newsgroups and Internet sites may be blocked).
96. See Mikkelsen, supra note 5, at 6; Kehoe, supra note 23, at 11; Provider Blocks
Neo-Nazi Tracts on Ne4 supra note 79, at D2.
97. For an excellent discussion on the inadequacy of applying traditional notions of
community standards in order to define indecency on computer networks in the United
States see Comment, Cyber-Pom Obscenity: The Vtability of Local Communt, Standards
and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15 Loy. L.A. EN-r. LJ. 415
(1995). For an illuminating discussion of the First Amendment and the Internet, see gener-
ally David Gordon, Taking the First Amendment on the Road. A Rationale for Broad Pro-
tection for Freedom of Expression on lhe Information Superhighway, 3 Co~.i.t. L.
CoNspEcrus 135 (1995). See also Norman Redlich & David R. Lurie, First Amendment
Issues Presented by the "Information Superhighway " 25 SErON HA.Lu L. REv. 1446 (1995).
98. Blacked-Out Web; ACLU to File First Suit Against Telecom Bill, Cobsma. DMLY,
Feb. 7, 1996, at 1.
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There is also a legitimate concern that Member States may move
to outlaw some forms of political speech.99 Member States have con-
tinued to act unilaterally with the sanction of a recently completed
Green Paper, drafted by the Commission, discussing the regulation of
Internet services as they impact minors and human dignity.100 The
Green Paper provides, in part, that that Member States and private
corporate actors are responsible for working together to regulate the
content of services available over the Internet.' 0'
The ease and unpredictability with which a Member State may
choose to exert jurisdiction over Internet related claim,; indicates not
only possible conflicts of law among Member States but a quickly de-
veloping body of cases and unilateral Member State prerogatives that
will define Internet regulation.'01 This type of regulation may restrict
EU citizens' rights to access information and receive Internet services
from certain sites.
As discussed in Part III, the Internet is a vehicle to quickly de-
liver information to a worldwide audience.0 3 Whether political
speech or commercial advertisements, Internet content is specifically
designed to reach both a local and global audience.'0° This means that
a number of Member States, under accepted principles of public inter-
national law, may have proper jurisdiction to legislate, prescribe, and
enforce their judgments at a national level.
B. General Principles of Exerting International Jurisdiction
The exact contours of who a Member State will attempt to exert
jurisdiction over is uncertain at this time. The current trend appears
to be to use national laws to either pursue the individual user who has
acquired illegal material over the Internet'0 or to pursue an action
99. See No Secrets on the Web, supra note 11, at 16A; see also Mikkelsen, supra note 5,
at 6.
100. Communication from the European Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee on the Regions:
Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and Informa-
tion Services, COM(96)483 final [hereinafter European Commission, Green Paper on the
Protections of Minors and Human Dignity].
101. Id.
102. See discussion infra Parts IV B & C.
103. See discussion infra Part III.A.
104. Id.
105. See Cath Everett, UK: Internet Paedophile Case Exposes Gaps in the Law, Reuter
Textline Computing, Jan. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ecnews File.
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against the private ISPs. 10 6 It is as yet unclear whether Member State
governments will successfully be able to prosecute actions against the
persons providing the information or services over the Internet if they
are not nationals.10 7 However, what is fairly clear is that the results of
these actions will be to punish the individual citizen who acquired the
illegal materiallos and/or to censor access to the Internet services pro-
viding the illegal material." 9
In order to appreciate the numerous international principles of
jurisdiction that may be employed to exert jurisdiction over Internet
related claims, it will be useful at this time to briefly review four tradi-
tional bases of exerting personal jurisdiction. The assumption is that a
Member State will be able to exert jurisdiction on the basis of at least
one of the following principles.
1. Territorial Principle (Subjective Territoriality)
The territorial principle of exerting jurisdiction reflects the most
basic element of state sovereignty which grants the state the right to
govern its population within its borders.110 Thus, when an act that is
deemed illegal, as defined by the standards of a particular state, occurs
within the boundaries of that state, general international law considers
the state right to determine the legality of an act to exert jurisdiction
over the actor as a "general and almost universal rule." ' The territo-
rial principle is therefore only concerned with two questions: whether
the conduct occurred within the state borders and whether the state
considers the conduct unlawful."
2
Applying this basis of exerting jurisdiction to Internet related
claims arising within a Member State, it would appear to be the
106. See AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet, supra note 91, at D2;
Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net supra note 79, at D2.
107. No formal charges were filed against the multinational ISPs or against any non-
nationals in Germany. See AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet, supra
note 84, at D2; Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note 79, at D2.; Ascarelli,
supra note 86. Currently many technology companies in the United States are paying close
attention to the litigation under way in France regarding French language content laws (the
Toubon law) as applied to the delivery of Internet related services. French Court to Test
Limits of Law in Cyberspace, supra note 12; Swardson, supra note 14.
108. See Everett, supra note 105.
109. See Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Nle supra note 79, at D2 (no discussion of
pursuing an action against the individuals in Germany accessing illegal information, only
the Internet access providers).
110. MARX W. JAm, AN INTRODUCTIoN TO INTERNATIONAL Lvw 322 (2d ed. 1993).
111. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,356 (1909). See also Rn.
srATEN= § 402.
112. RESrATEMNT § 402 (1987).
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strongest basis for a Member State to exert jurisdiction over its own
nationals or entities conducting business within its borders. A Mem-
ber State has a strong argument to regulate both the ISPs, the authors
of the content, and the consumers: end-users.113 Focusing on the con-
tent of the information, a Member State may deem certain subject-
matter illegal and thus any "conduct that, wholly, or in substantial
part, takes place within its [Member State] territory," can be properly
regulated.1 4 Additionally, a Member State may, based on "the status
of persons, or interests in things present within its terrilory,"- 5 regu-
late the information accessible by individuals over the llnternet."
16
2, Nationality Principle
The nationality theory of exerting jurisdiction holds that a state
must have the right to exercise jurisdiction over persons or things pos-
sessing its nationality, wherever they may be.117 Thus, under this basis
for jurisdiction, a state is not limited to exerting jurisdiction over par-
ties located within its territory, such as local Internet service providers
and consumers. A state may also extend the reach of its local stan-
dards internationally by subjecting its corporations and nationals lo-
cated in other countries to its jurisdiction.118 This means that the
individual user or a company headquartered in a Member State would
have to comply with legal standards that may not be those of the state
in which the individual resides or where business is conducted.'
1 9
3. Effects Principle (Objective Territoriality)
A more controversial basis for exerting jurisdiction over a claim
is the effects principle. 20 Rooted in the territorial principle, the
113. See generally AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet, supra note 91,
at D2.; Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note 79, at D2.
114. REsrATEmENT § 402.
115. Id.
116. See Everett, supra note 105.
117. JANIS, supra note 110, at 324. See also BARTOLUS DE SAXOFERATO, BARTOLUS ON
THE CoNFLicr OF LAWS 51 (Joseph H. Beale trans., Oxford University Press, 1914); CODE
CIVIL [C. cav.] art. 15 (Fr.) (which reads in relevant part that "Un Franqais pourra etre
traduit devant un tribunal de France, pour des obligations par lui ccntract~es en pays
6tranger, meme avec un dtranger.").
118. Id.
119. The Georgia Tech Lorraine litigation currently underway in France may be the
beginning of Member State standards reaching beyond the Member States. See French
Court to Test Limits of Law in Cyberspace, supra note 12; Swardson, supra note 14.
120. See Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 4, 18-28
(Sept. 7); Draft of Conventions Prepared for the Codification of International Law: Jurisdic-
tion with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 435, 487-88 (1935).
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premise is that when extraterritorial conduct has an effect within a
state, then a state has jurisdiction over that conduct.'- It is thus the
act itself, whether the locus of the act was territorial or extraterrito-
rial, that is the jurisdictional basis."= Often, the standard employed is
that the conduct of the illegal act must be completed within the bor-
ders of a state.123 This provides a basis for a state to exercise jurisdic-
tion over unlawful conduct originating outside its territory.2 4
As a general principle, the European Court of Justice has held
that to limit jurisdiction to the locus of the unlawful act would defeat
the purpose and spirit of numerous Community and Member State
lavs.' -- While controversial, this mitigated effects doctrine"-' means
that almost any state, and especially a Member State, may have a cog-
nizable claim to jurisdiction over Internet related claims that are "im-
plemented" in the EU.'2 7 Taking into account the global nature of the
Internet and the desire of service providers and authors to purpose-
fully reach a global audience,12 it appears that where any Member
State has promulgated or enacted particular standards for Internet
services, the Member State may have a basis for exerting jurisdiction
over not only territorial nationals, but international actors as well. 2 9
C. The Impact of Member States Exerting Jurisdiction to Censor
Content on the Internet
As a result of the technology and structure of the Internet, the
unilateral act of a single state, especially an EU Member State, can
create reverberations that echo not only within the territory of the
Member State, but around the globe. Individual states choosing to
censor Internet content can unilaterally create a standard for "accept-
able" subject matter that can become the de facto standard for numer-
ous other states. 30 The protocol used to allow all of the connected
121. Id. See also JAMs, supra note 110, at 326.
122. JAmS, supra note 110, at 326. Compare the territorial principle where the focus is
on the subject of the act or the actor which forms the basis of jurisdiction. Id
123. Id at 327.
124. l
125. Joined Cases, Nos. 89, 104, 114, 116-117, & 125-29185. A Ahlstrbm Oy v. Commis-
sion, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5240, 5244.
126. Id.
127. Id; Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 Cor.
NELL INT'L LJ. 101, 106 (1993) See generally REsTATEMENr § 402(c).
128. Europe: Net Asset - Internet Addresses, supra note 13.
129. JANm, supra note 110, at 327. See generally RESTATEMENr § 402(c).
130. AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Interne supra note 91, at D2; As-
carelli, supra note 86; Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note 86, at D2.
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networks to communicate with each other, TCP/IP, makes it clear that
only known Internet services may have their access blocked in a lim-
ited manner131 without causing unnecessary censorship of non-offend-
ing materials. 132 Additionally, if the computer networks of a Member
State are unable to provide access to certain portions cf the Internet,
then other states that rely on the retransmission of information from
the blocking Member State will also be denied access to the offending
Internet services. 33 Thus, the standard promulgated by one Member
State may create the de facto standard for the entire EU, until the
Member State changes its policy or until the network traffic over that
segment of the Internet is rerouted.'3 This may not be possible in
tightly integrated and shared network backbones such as that which
exists within the EU.
35
1. Germany
Germany has been the most active Member State pursuing cen-
sorship of the Internet and its related services.136 As a preventative
measure, T-Online, Germany's Deutsche Telekom Internet access ser-
vice blocked access to 1500 sites on a segment of the Internet that
contained some Neo-Nazi material. 37 The author of the material was
a Canadian citizen living in Toronto, while the ISP where the informa-
tion was stored on is located in Santa Cruz, California. 38 Relying on
131. AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet, supra note 91, at D2, As-
carelli, supra note 86; Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note 86, at D2.
132. Louise Kehoe, Battle to Block Porn on the Net - Louise Kehoe on Programs to
Limit the Reception of Inappropriate Material, FIN. TimEs, Jan. 22, 1996, at 11. The list of
Internet sites offending one standard or another grows monthly. Id. This is causing the
publishers of the software that controls access to Internet sites to constantly provide up-
dates to their software. Id.
133. Programs such as Net-Nanny (published by a Canadian software company) are
programmed with keyword searches that interrogate all incoming TCP/IP packets for the
programmed words. Id. Unfortunately, this will only block the most egregious offenders
and those who do not know enough to encode their messages. For a comprehensive analy-
sis of software applications that can be used to block access to Internet sites, see European




136. See generally Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note 86, at D2; AOL
Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet, supra note 91, at D2; Mikkelsen, supra
note 5, at 6.
137. AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet, supra note 91, at D2; As-
carelli, supra note 86; Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note 86, at D2.
138. Ascarelli, supra note 86.
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the effects principle of jurisdiction to justify its action,139 the Mann-
heim prosecutor's office stated that "because it's [the Neo-Nazi mate-
rial] available over the Internet, it also can be called up in
Germany... [t]hen the scene of the crime is all of Germany.'
14
0
In late December 1995, Munich prosecutors declared two hun-
dred sex-related Internet discussion forums as illegal under German
law. 4' United States based CompuServe Inc. responded by eliminat-
ing access to the groups for its 4 million members worldwide.4 2
America Online has followed suit raising the specter that perhaps
other ISPs may, in the future, take similar measures. 4 3 Because it is
difficult to effectively screen out limited segments and services pro-
vided over the Internet, when a Member State attempts to regulate
Internet services, services containing different subject matter may be
collaterally censored.'"
Additionally, Germany is debating the types of liability that may
attach to Internet or on-line services that provide access to pornogra-
phy or neo-Nazi propaganda.'45 Rita Suessmuth, President of the
Bundestag, the lower house of the German Parliament, has publicly
stated that "[f]reedom of expression reaches its limit when human dig-
nity is violated and violence is promoted.,
4 6
2. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK) has also taken steps to regulate the
Internet within its territory. The UK has adopted legislation to
criminalize transmitting and receiving child pornography over the In-
ternet. 47 An inter-departmental working group on obscenity has re-
cently been established to address problems of pornography on the
Internet.4 Acknowledging a lack of expertise in dealing with "hi-
tech cases," the United Kingdom is looking to the United States for
guidance.1
49
139. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
140. Ascarelli, supra note 86.
141. Provider Blocks Neo-Nazi Tracts on Net, supra note S6, at D2
142. Id.
143. See AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet, supra note 91, at D
144. Kehoe, supra note 124, at 11; European Commission, supra note 100. annex IV.
145. Mikkelsen, supra note 5, at 6.
146. Id.
147. UK Home Office Launches Internet Obscenity Research Group, Reuter Textline,
Jan. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ecnews File.
148. Id.
149. Everett, supra note 105.
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More recently, the government of the United Kingdom has pro-
moted industry'self-regulation.' 50 Only a few months old, the Internet
Watch Foundation is aimed at the discrete problem of child pornogra-
phy. 15 The success or failure of this type of effort remains to be seen.
D. Commission Ruling
The Commission recently responded to a written question from
the Parliament regarding censorship of pornographic messages on the
Internet.'52 The Commission responded that in light of the impossibil-
ity of censoring Internet material originating outside of the Commu-
nity without international agreements, it would leave the decisions of
what constitutes public morals and their protection as the responsibil-
ity of the Member States.'53
The policy of allowing Member States to independently develop
regulations to censor the Internet is a very counterproductive position
for the EU to maintain for two reasons. First, as the Commission has
recognized, the only way to offer true regulation of the services pro-
vided over the Internet is to enter into international agreements.154
However, the Community will find it difficult to negotiate an interna-
tional agreement when there is no Community standard, but rather an
amalgamation of standards provided by all the Member States.
-'5
Moreover, because of the technological repercussions that may limit
access to other data and/or services, 5 6 create higher co;ts to maintain
networks that must censor information, and increase the number of
different liabilities that an Internet service provider may encounter, it
will be more difficult to foster the regional and transnational coopera-
tion required for a successful trans-European network and the unfet-
tered delivery of Internet related services within the internal
market.1
57
The Internet is changing the face and nature of mass communica-
tions. It is creating a new legal context that requires a redefinition of
legal standards that will govern its use. 58 Perhaps the best vehicles
150. Strassel, supra note 20.
151. Id.
152. Written Question on the Internet and Public Morals-Telecomirunications and In-
formation Technology, 1995 OJ. (C 230) 26-27. [hereinafter Written Question]
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See discussion infra Part I.
156. Id.
157. See Green Paper, supra note 3, § 1.1.
158. Gordon, supra note 97, at 136.
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for these redefinition are the new regional economic integration orga-
nizations (REICOs) that share similar qualities. In order to explore
the legal machinations available to the EU to achieve this end, it will
prove useful to provide a brief overview of the division of powers
within the institutions of the EU.
V. The Harmonization of Laws Within the European Union
The delivery of Internet related services is a new form of com-
merce' 59 that, this Note argues, requires Community level action to
provide a definitive and meaningful set of fundamental rights. This
Note further posits, that in order to ensure satisfy the mandate of Ar-
ticle 7a, it will be necessary for the EU to employ a Regulation to
harmonize the fundamental rights governing the regulation of the de-
livery of Internet related services. 60
In order to understand what this means and how this can be
achieved within the EU, Part A will first discuss Community law
supremacy over Member States, using Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom as specific examples. Part B will explore whether
Internet access falls within the competency of EC Treaty Articles 59
and 60 as a "transfrontier service provided for remuneration" and the
competency of EU institutions to regulate.16 Part C will discuss what
the obligations of Member States are under the EC Treaty, focusing in
particular on what the harmonization of laws means and what law
controls when there is a disparity among Member State laws. Part D
will investigate the possibilities of promulgating regulations for the In-
ternet through the ECJ. Finally, Part E will focus on the feasibility of
Community legislative action.
A. Supremacy of Community Law over Member State Law
The EC Treaty does not contain an express supremacy clause ren-
dering Community law superior to national law in the event of a con-
flict. Therefore, Member States had to take specific actions to provide
159. The uniquely global nature of the Internet combined with the interdependency of
the national network segments required for its proper functioning are among the more
compelling reasons to consider delivery of Internet related services a new form of
commerce.
160. EC TREATY arts. 3(b), 7a. The term "four freedoms" describes EC Treaty Article
Three's protection of the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. EC
TREATY art. 3(b). See GEORGE A. BENtANN ET Ai., CASES AND MAERLx, s o-; EuRo.
PEAN Co~mnmrry LAw 428-29 (1993).
161. Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, 19SS E.C.R. 2035, 2130-31;
EC TREATY arts. 59-60.
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for Community law supremacy within their own legal framework.162
All the Member States amended their respective Constitutions, or in
dualist countries passed enacting legislation, reflecting the supremacy
of Community law.163 These measures reflected the assurances of Ar-
ticles 3(b) and 7a of the EC Treaty (as provided for by the SEA) for
an "internal market ... without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Treaty."'16 The internal market con-
templated by the TEU included the elimination of all barriers to the
free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital.
165
In France, Community provisions take precedent to any subse-
quent national legislation. 66 In construing the role of Community law
within the state, the French Conseil d'Etat agreed with the ECJ in
deBretagne v. Le Campion67 that Community law controlled over any
national court interpretation. 68 Furthermore, as part of the ratifica-
tion process for the TEU, France amended its Constitution to reflect
the power of the Community to make laws that bind France.
169
The German Basic Law170 has long recognized that public inter-
national law creates duties for its citizens. 7' The powe:r of these prin-
ciples over the populace is not absolute because it is subject to review
by national courts.' 72 Thus, although the Basic Law was amended in
1992 to include a specific transfer of additional powers to the EU,
17
162. Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 592-94.
163. See CONsTrruTION arts. 54, 55 (France); GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] arts.
23-25 (F.R.G.); EUR. COMMUNITIES Acr OF 1972 (ch. 68) (Eng).
164. EC TREATY arts. 3(b), 7a.
165. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Council, COM (85)310 (classifying the barriers as physical (e.g. customs posts), tech-
nical (e.g. standards for health, safety, environmental, or consumer protection), and fiscal.
See also Opinion on "Completing the Internal Market" - White Paper from the Commis-
sion to the European Council, 1985 OJ. (C 344) 16-20.
166. D. CURTIN ET AL., LEADING CASES ON THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES 303 (quoting Administration des Douanes v. Societe Cafes Jacques Vabre & J. Weigel
et CIE Sari, Fr. Cour de Cassation (combined chambers) [1974] cass. ch. mix. 6, [1975] 2
C.M.L.R. 336, May 24, 1975 (holding that subsequent national customs law was invalid
since it controverted Article 95 of the EC Treaty)).
167. Case 218/85, De Bretagne v. Le Campion, 1986 E.C.R. 3153.
168. See Re Maurice Boisdet, French Conseil d'Etat [1990] Recueil Lebon 250, [1991] 1
C.M.L.R. 3 (1990).
169. CONSTrrUTION arts. 55, 88-84 (Fr.).
170. A translation of the German designation for the German Constitution. DAvID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1 (1994).
171. GRUNDEGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 25 (F.R.G.).
172. GG art. 25.
173. GG art. 23.
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most EU activities with a direct effect in Germany can still be subject
to review by national courts.174
Under Article 23 of the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court of
Germany retains the right to review Community Law and the actions
of Community institutions to establish their constitutionality under
German law.' 75 Thus, Community law, as well as ECJ decisions, con-
trol over German law to the extent that they comport with the theory
of proportionality and guarantee "protection for fundamental rights
essentially comparable to that provided for by [the] Basic Law."176
EU institutional actions that directly affect Germany will also be re-
viewed to ensure that they do not "treat or develop the Union Treaty
[TEU] in a way that was not longer covered by the Treaty in the form
that is the basis for the Act of Accession."'" The impact of these
reservations is minimal however as the ECJ has adopted a large por-
tion of the German general principles of law and fundamental
rights.1
78
The United Kingdom requires an Act of Parliament in order for a
treaty to take effect. 79 Although the issue of parliamentary sover-
eignty, whereby the British Parliament enjoys final authority to estab-
lish the legal norms effective in the United Kingdom', remains,
English courts have shown an extreme willingness to reconcile Com-
munity law with national law.lSl
174. Id art. 23.
175. Id art. 23.
176. Id art. 23; Cases 2 BvR nos. 2134 & 2159192, Manfred Brunner and Others vs.
European Union Treaty, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 89 (1992).
177. Brunner, supra note 176, at 89. For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the
evolution of the Supremacy Doctrine in Germany, see Currie, supra note 170, at 93-101.
178. See discussion infra V.A, C, & D.
179. See McWhirtler v. Attorney General, 1972 C.M.LR. M. (Eng. C.A., 1972).
180. Case C-213189, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport Ex Parte Factortame
Ltd., (House of Lords, 1991), 1 All E.R. 70, 3 C.M.L.R. 375 (1990).
181. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, 3 All ER 325, 3 C.M.L.R. 44 (1979). The English court
stated, "In construing our statute, we are entitled to look to the [EC] Treaty as an aid to its
construction: but not only as an aid but an overriding force. If on close investigation it
should appear that our legislation is deficient-or is inconsistent with Community law-by
some oversight of our draftsmen-then it is our bounden duty to give priority to Commu-
nity law. Such is the result of section 2(1) and (4) of the European Communities Act [of]
1972." Id at 328-29 (emphasis added). See also Factortame Ltd., I All E.R. at 103 (quot-
ing Lorde Bridge of Hardwich's opinion) "Under that Act [the European Communities
Act of 1972] it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when
delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict .ith
any directly enforceable rule of Community law." Id.
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B. The Status of Internet Related Services Under the EC Treaty
In order to qualify as a "service" that gains the protection of the
EC Treaty against restrictions, a service must satisfy two elements.
182
First it must meet the definition of "services" outlined it Article 60 by
being a service "normally provided for remuneration.' ' 183 Second, it
must also be a transnational service that "pursues activities" in more
than one Member State.184 Although it may be conceptually difficult
to ascertain the origin of many Internet related services, access to the
Internet and all its related services is a booming global enterprise."8 5
This would indicate that the Internet is a service that "pursues activi-
ties" in more than one Member State.' 86 Therefore, Internet related
services appear to easily qualify as services under the EC Treaty.
Article 66 of the EC Treaty contains public policy exceptions that
refer back to and incorporate Articles 55 and 56.187 Article 55 states
that "[t]he provisions of this Chapter shall not apply, so far as any
given member State is concerned, to activities which in that State are
connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of cfficial author-
ity."'8 This sovereign powers reservation is still subject to the second
paragraph of Article 55, which grants the Council the broad power,
through a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, to
rule that "provisions of this Chapter (including this exception) shall
not apply to certain activities."'1 89 Although the prescription of public
morals may arguably appear to be an issue of sovereignty, perhaps the
better argument for the Community as a whole is that the Community
should define a Community baseline for public morals, below which
the Member States may not regulate.
Given the uniquely global nature of the Internet, combined with
the legal reality that since all citizens of Member State3 are also citi-
zens of the EU 19 and have been given significant rights to vote in
municipal elections and hold municipal offices in Member States not
their own' 91 it would seem that the "public", in this discrete instance,
should be defined by the Community public, not the Member State
182. EC TREATY arts. 59-60.
183. Id. art. 60
184. Id.
185. See Salmon & Jones, supra note 83.
186. See discussion infra Part III.
187. EC TREATY art. 66
188. Ia art. 55.
189. Id.
190. I& art. 8.
191. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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public."9 Otherwise, to allow a Member State to regulate what public
morals are on the Internet would necessarily mean that Community
standards are dictated by a single Member State more than any other,
thus de facto creating a very undemocratic, and possibly illegal, pro-
cess. But perhaps this dilemma itself, conflicting public morals(policy
concerns creates the most compelling case for treating the delivery of
Internet related services as a new form of services that requires
harmonization.
Article 56, the public policy exception of the EC Treaty, has not
been read as a broad exception although the language of the Article
may indicate the contrary. "As an exception to a fundamental princi-
ple of the Treaty, Article 56 of the Treaty must be interpreted in such
a way that its effects are limited to that which is necessary in order to
protect the interests which it seeks to safeguard."'1 93 Similar to Article
55, Article 56 contains a Community institutional bypass procedure in
the second paragraph. 94 However, the same argument presented
against Article 55 would appear to successfully address the exceptions
conveyed in Article 56.195
C. The Focus of Harmonization
As another fundamental field of Community action, the harmoni-
zation of Community laws across Member States paves the way for
the "four freedoms"' 96 to overcome different Member State percep-
tions of "public order" defined in Article 36197 by accelerating the
establishment of an internal market through Community level legisla-
192. Article 55 of the EC Treaty states in relevant part that "[tihe provisions of this
chapter shall not apply, so far as any given member-State is concerned, to activities which
in that State are connected, even occasionally, vith the exercise of official authority." EC
TREATY art. 55. Article 56 of the EC Treaty adds the further exception that -[the provi-
sions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the ap-
plicability of provisions laid down by lav, regulation, or administrative action providing for
special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health." Id.
193. Bond van Adverteerders, 1988 E.C.R. at 2135.
194. Article 56 of the EC Treaty states in relevant part that "the Council shall, acting in
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b, issue directives for the coordi-
nation of such provisions." EC TREATY art. 56(2).
195. Id. art. 56.
196. BEMANN Er AT., supra note 160, at 428-29.
197. Daniel Vignes, The Harmonisation of National Legislation and the EEC, 15 Eur.
L. REv 358, 358-59 (1990).
1997]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tion.198 Although harmonization procedures are rooted in Commu-
nity law, the practical effects of harmonization are that national
provisions of the Member State that will continue to be respected af-
ter harmonization, not the supranational law, until the national legis-
lation is amended by the Member State.199 This reflects the same
principle guiding Community application of "general principles of
law," namely that Member State recognition in the Community is crit-
ical even though the particulars of the "principles" may often be
debated.200
In the absence of the harmonization of national rules, "[iut falls
within the residual power of each Member State to regulate, restrict
or even totally prohibit" certain activities in its territory.20 1 However,
the Member State must still treat all services in that field identically,
whatever their origin or nationality unless the EC Treaty provides for
an express derogation.202 Therefore, such wide latitude in regulating
the delivery of Internet related services should be of great concern to
the EU with the current lack of harmonization.20 3
Moreover, the EU should have little to fear in the near future,
from Member States successfully taking a public morals exception
under Article 56 of the EC Treaty. Although the language of Article
56 appears to grant Member States broad discretion to take excep-
tions or regulate based on public measures, the ECJ has indicated that
"measures taken by virtue of that [Article 56] article must not be dis-
proportionate to the intended effect. ' '204 The ECJ has recognized that
an exception to a fundamental principle of the EU, such as harmoni-
zation, requires a very narrow interpretation.20 5
Thus far, the EU has provided only lackluster leadership in this
area. The EU's attitude towards Internet regulation is exemplified in
a recent response to a written question submitted by a member of the
Parliament concerning the prevention of Internet content considered
198. Bernd Langeheine, Le Rapprochement des Lgislations Nationaies Scion L 'Article
100 A Du Trait CEE: L'Harmonsation Communautaire Face Aux Exigeqces de Protection
Nationales, 328 REvuE DU MARCHt COMMUN 347, 347 (1989).
199. Vignes, supra note 197, at 359.
200. Id. See discussion infra Part V.A regarding, among other things, the German reser-
vation, through Article 23 of the Basic Law, to review even Regulations to ensure that they
comport with certain principles.
201. Bond van Adverteerders, 1988 E.C.R. at 2120.
202. Id. at 2134-35.
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to be "in conflict with public morals."2  As discussed above, it is
within the prerogative and competency of the Member States to rule
on issues concerning public morals. However, the ECI, consistent
with Article 56(2) as ratified by all Member States under the TEU,
provides the EU a mechanism to review the effects of Member State
actions under the theory of proportionality. In order to avoid the ad-
ditional conflict that may arise as a result of Member States filling the
void where the EU has not regulated, the EU should simply provide a
baseline: a unified set of fundamental rights governing the delivery of
services over the Internet based in the competency granted the EU
under Article 100a through Article 7a.
Otherwise, the lack of a harmonizing mandate from the EU pro-
vides the Member States with two bites at the Internet regulation ap-
ple: first, under the basic principle that a Member State has the de
facto competency to regulate in the face of the lack of EU regulation,
and second, the public morals exception under Article 56. This frame-
work only invites a fragmented response by the Member States. On
November 27, 1996 the Commission publishes a Communication titled
"Europe at the Forefront of the Global Information Society: A Roll-
ing Action Plan."207 This Communication outlines the priorities and
goals of the EU with regards to the delivery of Internet related and
the information society in Europe.2 s The Commission believes "[the]
value added of Community level action... [as setting up] a common
framework, to coordinate various activities, and to act as a
catalyst."
20 9
However, in light of the growing services and information avail-
able over the Internet, including offshore banking in the form of the
European Union Bank, the need to decide on a supranational regula-
tory mechanism is imperative.210 This imperative will exist for the in-
dividual Internet consumer, so that, for example, they may know
whether their deposits are covered by insurance.211 This imperative
will also exist for Member States as they struggle to deal with all im-
206. Written Question, supra note 152, at 27.
207. Communication from the European Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee on the Regions: 'Eu-
rope at the Forefront of the Global Information Society: Rolling Action Plan.'
COM(96)607.
208. Id. at 1-3.
209. Id. at 4.
210. Rob Murray, Money-Go-Round: Take Care Not to Let Cash Slip Through the Net,
DAmy TELEGrAPH, Feb. 17, 1996, at 15.
211. Id.
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portant tax issues, such as whether a Web site may be considered a
permanent establishment and to how to tax software transactions over
the Internet.212
Article 7a of the EC Treaty states that "the internal market shall
comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance
with the provisions of this treaty. '213 Since Internet related services
do indeed appear to satisfy the definition of services laid out in the EC
Treaty,214 the Commission, or the Parliament indirectly, has a basis of
action to propose Community control over the services. Such control
should be exercised to facilitate business and consumer community
looking standards on surety and safety over the Internet.
D. European Court Of Justice
Although Article 7a of the EC Treaty establishes the "four free-
doms,' 21 5 Article 59 provides the ECJ a basis to review Member State
regulations regarding the delivery of Internet related services.216
Although Article 59 of the EC Treaty is quite clear in its goals to har-
monize and integrate the services within the EU,211 it specifically
states that "barriers to provide services within the Community shall be
progressively abolished during the transitional period. 2 18
[T]he freedom to provide services, as one of the fundamental princi-
ples of the Treaty, may be restricted only by provisions which are
justified by the general good and which are applied to all person or
undertakings operating within the territory of the State in which the
service is provided in so far as that interest is not safeguarded by the
provisions to which the provider of the Service is subject in the
Member State of his establishment. In addition, such requirements
must be objectively justified by the need to ensure that professional
212. Financial Services, Internet, Among Top Foreign Issues, Treasury Official Says, Int'l
Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA), Jan. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, BNA library. U.S. Deputy
International Tax Counsel Carol Doran Klein commented that the U.S. "cannot, and will
not, tolerate continuation of treaties that no longer implement ... important U.S. tax
policy and whose continued existence creates a hole in the fabric of that policy." Id.
213. EC TREATY art. 7a.
214. Id. art. 60.
215. Id. art. 3.
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rules of conduct are complied with and that the interests which such
rules are designed to safeguard are protected.219
As discussed infra, Member States clearly run the risk of imping-
ing upon the free flow of Internet related services, by blocking out
services to whole sections of the Internet. Therefore, it appears that if
the Commission, under Article 169, or another Member State, under
Article 170, an infraction procedure the ECJ would have to review
and rule on the claims of the case.
Upon bringing the case before the ECJ, the Member State's cen-
sorship action would be reviewed under a general principle of law
known as the theory of proportionality. 0 "The 'European model' of
protection of fundamental rights" rests on the existence of two distinct
supranational legal orders," 1 namely, the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) legal order and the Community legal or-
der."'  The ECJ has recognized that the Treaties establishing the Eu-
ropean Communities "perform the same function of a constitution in
a composite legal order, which means that the institutions of this legal
order, as well as its constituent entities see their political decision-
making process constrained by the rules laid down in the Treaties." 22
219. Case 205184, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 19S6 E.C.R. 3755, 3903
(emphasis added).
220. For a discussion of "general principles of law" as a source of European Commu-
nity law, see HENRY G. ScERirmRs & DENTS NVAELBROECR, JUDICIAL PROTECtON IN
TnE EUROPEAN COmkiuNrnIs 27-98 (5th ed. 1992). See also Michael Akehurst, The Ap-
plication of General Principles of Law by the Court of Justice of the European Conmmni-
ties, 52 BaT. Y.B. INf'L L. 29 (1982).
221. Koen Lenaerts, Fundamental Rights to be Included in a Community Catalogue, 16
EuR. L. REv. 367, 376-77 (1991). "The nucleus (of Community fundamental rights] is
made up by the fundamental rights contained in the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its (present and future) Protocol-
which are included as such into the Community constitution. The next circle consists of
general principles of law whose respect the Court of Justice enforces at present on the basts
of Article 164 EEC, referring to "the law" (apparently a kind of unwritten higher law)
which is to be observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaty (that is the
written constitution).". Id. at 376-77 (emphasis added). See generally Case 294$3, Parti
6cologiste 'Les Verts' v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339,1365. ("It must first be emphasized
in this regard that the [then]European Economic Community is a Community based on the
rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States, nor its institutions can avoid reievw of
the question of whether measures adopted by them are in conformity with basic constitu-
tional charter, the Treaty.").
222. Lenaerts, supra note 221, at 377.
223. Id.
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Although only Article 215 suggests the application of general
principles of law,2 4 the ECJ has "frequently applied general princi-
ples of law in other contexts also."'225 These principles are applied in
three different manners. First, they are employed to "interpret the
Treaties and acts adopted by the institutions of the Communities to
implement the Treaties, '226 although they will not be applied when it
is clear the drafters of the treaty intended to reject a principle or when
there is a conflict between the Treaty and general principles of law.2 7
Second, it is "used to fill gaps in the Treaties or in acts adopted by
Community institutions."228 Finally, general principles of law provide
a criterion for assessing the validity of acts adopted by Community
institutions.229
These general principles may be derived from those of the Mem-
ber States, so although one may argue that whether an individual state
passes on legislation or the ECJ does, there may be little difference
because they may both apply the same doctrines of law. The ECS will
provide a single source of law and a legitimate expression of Commu-
nity standards. Additionally, the ECJ has utilized general principles
of law much more than any other international tribunal. 230 The fact
that a Member State is silent on a point does not prevent the ECJ
from applying a principle which is clearly established by the laws of
the other Member States.231
Member States must thus comply not only with the provisions of
Article 56, as far as service providers from other Member States are
concerned, but their actions are also subject to the theory of propor-
tionality. And although the principle of proportionaliy is arguably
borrowed from the German legal principle of Verhltnisniissigkeit, the
ECJ has more and differing voices to reconcile a policy result than a
single national court would face, thus it has had to develop and evolve
tools necessary to deal with this issue. 2
32
224. EC TREATY art. 215, which in relevant part states that, "[i]n thc case of non-con-
tractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance with general principles common to the
laws of the Member States. . ." (emphasis added).
225. Akehurst, supra note 220, at 29. See also EC TREATY art. 215.
226. Akehurst, supra note 220, at 29.
227. Id. at 30 n.1.
228. Id. at 30.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 31.
231. See Schermers & Waelbroeck, supra note 220, at 27-94.
232. Akehurst, supra note 220, at 38. One of the seminal cases on the ECJ's recogni-
tion of general principles of law is Case 11f7o, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Ftlr Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
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Although the ECJ has held that "there is no such thing as a gen-
eral principle of objective unfairness under Community law,"2 33 it has
recognized that:
[R]espect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the gen-
eral principles of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protec-
tion of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, must be ensured within the frame-
work of the structure and objective of the Community.234
The inquiry is whether the implementation of EU measures abridges
any right of a fundamental nature"35 The test requires that the
means used to achieve a given end must be no more than that which
is appropriate and necessary to achieve that end. The test puts the
burden on the administrative authority to justify its actions and re-
quires some consideration of possible alternatives. In this respect, it
is a more rigorous test than one based on reasonableness?-"
Applying this test to the action taken by the German government in
regulating the Internet, it appears that the theory of proportionality
has not been satisfied. The collateral impact on other services and the
dangerous precedent set for other Member States indicates that the
German response was not suitable, necessary or appropriate to curb
the activities of international actors. Viable alternatives for the Ger-
man government could have included simply prosecuting consumers
of the illegal material or passing laws that govern the sale of Internet
"browsers" which require the installation of site-blocking software3 7
The danger in relying upon the ECJ to create standards for regu-
lating the Internet is that every successive court decision may slightly
alter the prior principles in a manner contrary to the laws of all Mem-
ber States. s On the other hand, English Common Law and the case
law of the French Conseil d',tat have provided satisfactory judicial
233. Case C-174189, Hoche v. Bundesantalt Fflr Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung,
1990 E.C.R. I-26S1, 2711.
234. International Handelsgeselichaft mbH, 1970 E.C.R at 1134.
235. JOSEPHU-N STEnER, TE\"r-ooK oN EEC LAv 65 (4th ed. 1994).
236. Id.
237. The following cases have found Member State actions invalid because of the exist-
ence of less restrictive measures: Case 33f74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijf-
sverenniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299 (the administration of justice
under Community law demands that the Member State employ the least restrictive meas-
ures available); see also Case 279180, Criminal Proceedings Against Webb, 1981 E.C.Rt
3305.
238. Akehurst, supra note 220, at 40.
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legislation in their respective Member States.239 Moreover, since the
ECJ is relying on general principles of law that "share the characteris-
tic of being based-in their very essence, not necessarily in their precise
contours-on the common legal traditions of the Member States,"
240
then the ECJ is simply applying principles "which are or ought to be
part of the laws of those member States. ' 241 However, since the ECJ
would be in effect creating law, one could argue that the process is
undemocratic, illegal, and unfair.
E. Legislative Powers of EU Institutions
Under the TEU and the EC Treaty, the legislative body of the
Community may employ a number of separate Articles in order to
adopt legislation regulating the Internet. For example, unlike the un-
certainty of an ECJ promulgated solution to the regulation of Internet
related services, a Directive, as permitted by EC Treaty Article 189
and initiated by the Commission, would create a concrete mandate
from which to develop Community standards to regulate Internet re-
lated services.242 Attempting harmonization through anything less
than a Directive would not achieve the application of uniform funda-
mental rights, nor will it provide a strong basis for ECI reviews, but
rather it would result in Member States being required to do no more
than vaguely commit.243 This may cause more complications than
those encountered without any Community action or from the Courts
alone.
Articles 100 & 100a of the EC Treaty grant a broad power to the
EU institutions to legislate harmonization, through Directives & Reg-
ulations under Article 100a, and through Directives alone, in Article
1 0 0 .
244 The requirements for action under Article 100, however, are
239. Id.
240. Lenaerts, supra note 221, at 383.
241. Akehurst, supra note 220, at 43.
242. EC TREATY art. 189. Article 189 defines the power of a directive as "binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each member-State to which it is address.!d, but shall leave
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." Id. This type of legislation
would appear to provide the general latitude that Member States may feel they need in
attempting to address their tripartite concerns, while providing the EU with a baseline
below which a Member State may not appropriately regulate.
243. For an in depth review of EU harmonization, see generally Vignes, supra note 197.
244. Article 100 of the EC Treaty states that "[t]he Council shall... issue directives for
the approximation of such laws, regulations, or administrative provisions of the member-
States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the comwon market." EC
TREATY art. 100. Article 100a, paragraph 1 adds that "[b]y way of derogation from Article
100 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply
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very stringent. In addition to consulting the Economic and Social
Committee and the Parliament, the Council's vote must be unanimous
before action can be taken. 2 s Article 100a, on the other hand, per-
mits a qualified majority vote of the Council,2' and the approval of
Parliament to adopt Directives and Regulations. 47 Thus, its proce-
dural obstacles are very light when compared to Article 100-43 More-
over, Article 100 is a general harmonization clause aimed at the
"common market," while Article 100a is a specific "derogation from
Article 100" which is aimed at achieving the objectives of an internal
market where the delivery of services can occur without internal barri-
ers. Therefore, Article 100a, as lex specialis to Article 100, would sup-
ply the correct legal basis by which the EU can initiate a
harmonization Directive with respect to the delivery of Internet re-
lated services.
249
Article 100a(4) of the EC Treaty provides an "opt-out" clause
through the incorporation of Article 36, by which a Member State
may go beyond the standards of a Directive and employ stronger na-
tional provisions even in the face of harmonization measures32 This
is a rarely used exception"' and even where employed, the Member
State must justify why the more stringent standard is required.2 - Ad-
ditionally, the Commission will review the derogation to verify that it
is not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States, and that it comports with a theory of
proportionality with respect to the rights the Member State wishes to
protect.253 Thus, the opportunity for Member States to provide pro-
for the achievements of the objectives set out in Article 7a: "[t]he Council shall ... adopt
the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or ad-
ministrative action in member States which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the internal market." Id. art. 100a.
245. l
246. Id (referring to the procedures set forth in Article 189b of the Treaty wvhich allow
for a qualified majority vote by the Council).
247. Id.
248. For an enlightening and thorough discussion of the substantive benefits of the de-
velopment and use of Article 100a, see Langeheine, supra note 198, at 34S-51.
249. Langeheine, supra note 198, at 351. This same argument can be applied to the
inapplicability of Article 235 in evaluating the national derogations available under Article
100a(4). Id. at 351 n. 39.
250. EC TREATY arts. 36, 100(a)(4); Langeheine, supra note 193, at 353-55.
251. Case C-41/93 France v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R 1829. See generally Michel Wael-
broeck, The Role of the Court of Justice in the Implementation of the Single European Act,
11 MICK- IT'L LJ. 671, 6S4-SS (1990).
252. EC TREATY arts. 36, 100(a)(4); Langeheine, supra note 198, at 353-57.
253. EC TREATY art. 100(a)(4); Langeheine, supra note 198, at 357.
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tection beyond the Community baseline would be effectively ad-
dressed, while simultaneously providing the business community with
a fairly consistent set of standards from which to begin to operate.
VI. Comparison of Worldwide Responses
The current trend by governments worldwide is to respond with a
heavy hand to material on the Internet that goes against "public
morals. 254 In the following brief survey of international responses, it
quickly becomes apparent that the Community standards unilaterally
proposed by regulating nations as the basis for the censorship are post
hoc and very vague. The concern is that once one government takes
measures to censor Internet related services, many other governments
will follow their example. 5
Raising the specter of national security, the Xinhua News
Agency, the official news agency of the People's Republic of China
(PRC), prohibited the distribution of non-official news and data over
the Internet.256 All foreign news services are required to register their
information with Xinhua, who will then decide what information can
be distributed and at what cost.257 Despite the significant demand for
foreign news services approximately 1000 clients across the PRC,
Xinhua has stated that the "government will punish providers of eco-
nomic information that's 'forbidden' or that 'slanders or jeopardizes
the national interests of China."258 Very specious terms grant Xinhua
a great deal of latitude in controlling the information approved for
dissemination. Although there have been articles representing that
these Internet rules can be regarded as a "Green Light" for Internet
information service development, the fact remains that all users must
register with the state police259 and that violation of the dissemination
of vague state secret laws is punishable by heavy fines and/or death.260
In fact, Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, a senior party leader has publicly
254. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
255. Mikkelsen, supra note 5, at 6.
256. Joseph Kahn, China Chokes Flow of News About Business, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 17,
1996, at Bi.
257. Id.
258. Id. (emphasis added). Foreign news services have approximately 1,000 clients
across the People's Republic of China. Id.
259. Jeffrey Parker, China's Internet Rules Seen as Green Light, Reu:ers World Service
Feb. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ecnews File; see alyo Uli Schmetzer,
China Orders Internet Users to Register with the Police; Beijing Worried it is Losing Monop-
oly over Information, Cmi. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1996, at 7.
260. Schmetzer, supra note 259, at 7.
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stated that it is "[b]etter to kill 1000 in error than let even one slip
through."
261
In a further attempt to control the flow of information beyond
the business wires to what the individual user accesses. Beijing has
place a moratorium on new Internet membership as it seeks a solution
that would allow it to monitor all "links" made outside of China's
"intranet.
262
The United States has adopted a similarly vague standard of inde-
cency in the Telecommunications Bill of 1996 .263 United States Sena-
tor Patrick Leahy said in introducing a bill to repeal the provisions:
"The U.S. government is paving the way for censorship of Internet
speech... What do we think the Iranian government will make ille-
gal? What could Libya ban and criminalize?" 
26
VII. Conclusion
"The problem is the Internet has no geographical boundaries, but
laws do. As a result, government legislators tend to go after the takers
rather than the pushers. There'll be problems until we can commit to
common laws worldwide. '265 There is a hysteria sweeping across the
world, creating a legal backlash of vague standards and non-propor-
tional responses to the regulation of Internet related service delivery.
A new communications paradigm like the Internet requires new ways
of defining standards to govern its use. Regional economic integra-
tion organizations, such as the EU, have redefined how the individual
states of the world view themselves as part of a greater whole. These
organizations are the mechanisms through which states should at-
tempt to regulate the delivery of Internet related services.
In the European Union, there appears to be a substantial basis
for judicial and legislative action by the Community. Although judi-
cial action may appear to be more expedient, the specific regulations
proposed and implemented will be difficult to predict. Alternatively,
while Community legislative action may require more time and effort,
it offers the certainty required to develop regulations that provide for
a "Community" standard to govern Internet related services. In either
261. Parker, supra note 259.
262. Joseph Kahn et al., Beijing Seeks to Build an Internet that Can be Censored, Dow
Jones News Service, Jan. 31, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Euronews Database.
263. Mikkelsen, supra note 5, at 6.
264. Id.
265. Everetts, supra note 105 (quoting Clive Gringras, a la yer %Nith Nabarro
Nathanson).
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case, resolution of this issue at the Community level will serve as a
model for other regional economic integration organizations.
The EU's response has been lackluster. Its most iecent publica-
tion regarding policy options and its conclusion regarding illegal and
harmful content on the Internet encourages Member States to re-
spond with self-regulation (both private and public efforts) and coop-
eration.266  The opportunity for Community level certainty,
integration, and standards is quickly dissipating as each Member State
plots its own course, with Germany and the United Kingdom already
clearly preferring substantially different degrees of government
regulation.
Once an ECJ decision is issued or a Directive is passed, the Com-
munity may take the further step of sponsoring and promoting an in-
dustry rating system, such as that launched by the Recreational
Software Advisory Council on the Internet (RSACi).2 67 The RSACi
system combines an objective rating system, based on information vol-
untarily provided by the proprietors of the services, with a blocking
mechanism on browsers.268 Microsoft and SurfWatch, a leading pro-
vider of software that blocks access to undesirable World Wide Web
sites, have both endorsed the RSACi system.269 The European Union
should follow RSACi's example.
If we are able to view cyberspace as more than just digital impulses-
in short, if we are able to view electronic space as a functional if not
a physical equivalent of public spaces as we knew them before digi-
tal communication-we can apply an appropriately dynamic and cre-
ative approach to legal issues inherent in the regulation of the
information superhighway.
270
The EU, and other regional economic integration organizations,
represent the "dynamic and creative" tool necessary to forge regula-
tions on the delivery of Internet related services at the appropriate
level. The EU can provide a baseline set of fundamental rights (both
266. Illegal and Harmful Content, supra note 20, at 23-26.
267. Recreational Software Advisory Council Launches Objective, Content Labeling Ad-
visory System for the Internet; RSACi System Praised by Industry as Empowering Parents
and Consumers While Preserving Free Speech on the Internet, Business Wire, Feb. 28, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
268. Id.
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Access to Internet Content, Business Wire, Feb. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, AllwId File.
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social and economic) on the Internet which all Member States must
protect. Otherwise, if a region as tightly integrated as the EU is un-
able to successfully promulgate a set of fundamental rights, what suc-
cess can the Commission expect when it expresses its desire to forge a
much farther reaching global agreement? It would appear that a
model of success at a regional level would provide the international
impetus required to generate a truly global agreement.

